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CONFLICT OF LAWS:
ALAS, CONFUSION STILL REIGNS
RICHARD J. CONVISER*
THE BACKGROUND
ORE THAN six years have lapsed since the Illinois Supreme
Court decided Wartell v. Formusa.' In issue there was the
law governing interspousal tort immunity. The result: the
law of common domicile governs, not the law of the place of the in-
jury.2  Thus, the court chose not to apply the standard vested rights
rule, but opted in favor of a modern policy-oriented approach.
Some considered Wartell a watershed in Illinois conflicts law, to
wit, the abandonment of the theretofore dominant vested rights ap-
proach.3 This interpretation appeared unwarranted.' If doubts ex-
isted, subsequent decisions laid them to rest.
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University; B.A., J.D., University of
California (Berkeley); Dr. Jur., University of Cologne (Germany).
1. 34 111. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
2. Mr. and Mrs. Gerald Wartell, residents of Illinois, were involved in an au-
tomobile accident in Florida. Mrs. Wartell commenced an action in Illinois
against her husband's estate alleging wilful and wanton negligence. Florida per-
mits suits between spouses; Illinois, by statute, does not. Illinois law was applied,
and the suit dismissed.
3. Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, n.2
(1969). Professor Juenger's conclusion might well have been induced by the au-
thorities cited in Wartell. See 213 N.E.2d at 545. The court's string of citations
included such "modem approach case notables" as Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See also Note, Conflict
of Laws, Illinois Tort Choice-of-Law Problems Move Toward Further Confusion,
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 841 (1970).
4. See Note, Husband and Wife-Conflicts of Laws, 54 ILL. B.J. 824, 825
(1966); Note, Conflict of Laws, The Most Significant Relationship Test in Multi-
State Tort Cases, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 947, 948 (1971).
The Wartell decision would appear to stand for the rather narrow proposition
that questions of interspousal immunity are to be governed by the law of the state
of common domicile. But no more. The opinion itself appears to negate a
broader interpretation. It states that the law of the place of wrong would ".
of course determine whether or not a tort has in fact been committed.
34 I1l. 2d at 59, 213 N.E. 2d at 545 [emphasis added].
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The ensuing four-year period found the practicing bar mired in
the midst of a foggy never-never land. Dicta in Graham v. General
U.S. Grant Post No. 2665 indicated the willingness on the part of
the court to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts "most
significant relationship" approach.6 But one year later, and again
by dicta, it indicated approval of the vested rights approach without
so much as the briefest mention of either the Restatement (Second)
or the earlier Graham decision.7
Just as it began to appear that confusion would reign supreme,8
the court handed down its decision in Ingersoll v. Klein.9 It
adopted there the Restatement (Second) approach for multi-state
tort cases.10
See also Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 248 N.E.2d
657, 659 (1969), where the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that Wartell sup-
ports only this narrow proposition. This construction was also apparently adopted
by a federal court in Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), although the language in this decision, after an initial strong statement
to this effect, equivocated somewhat.
5. 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969).
6. In Graham, the supreme court considered whether Illinois' dramshop statute
should be given extraterritorial effect. The court analyzed this issue in "most sig-
nificant relationship" terms only to render it dictum by concluding that this matter
should not be resolved by a judicially-applied conflicts analysis, but rather was a
matter for the legislature to resolve.
7. Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
Marchlik involved application of a Wisconsin direct action statute against Illinois
insurers. After concluding that such statutes are generally a substantive matter to
be governed by the lex loci-in this case Wisconsin-the court refused application
of Wisconsin law on public policy grounds.
At least one author construed Marchlik as a reversion to the vested rights ap-
proach. See 64 Nw. U.L. REV. at 843. This conclusion, however, would appear
supportable only if one broadly interprets Wartell. As indicated above, this would
be inappropriate. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Rather that decision
would have been inapplicable in Marchlik because it is limited to interspousal suits.
As such, the Marchlik decision was potentially in keeping with the then prevailing
Illinois rule.
8. Compare Waxman, Conflict in Illinois Courts on Choice of Law Theory in
Torts-Is It Lex Loci Delictus or Substantive Interest? 59 ILL. B.J. 212 (1970);
Note, Conflict of Laws, Illinois Tort Choice-of-Law Problems Move Toward
Further Confusion, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 841 (1970). The situation was not aided by
the strict adherence of a number of Illinois appellate courts to the traditional rule.
See, e.g., Bridges v. Ford Motor Co., 104 Ill. App. 2d 26, 243 N.E.2d 559 (1968);
Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co., 106 Ill. App. 2d 190, 245 N.E.2d 596 (1969).
9. 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
10. Ingersoll involved application of a wrongful death statute. Even though
the injuries causing death allegedly occurred in Iowa, the court applied Illinois law,
finding that it as the forum state and domicile of both parties to the action, had a
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THE PROBLEM
Ingersoll clearly helped clarify matters. Unfortunately, the clarifi-
cation was incomplete. Should the holding there be confined to
multi-state tort cases? Or is it to have broader application? The
opinion could support either conclusion. 1'
A YEAR OF NON-RESOLUTION
Resolution of this problem was, without doubt, the main task con-
fronting Illinois courts last year. The task remains. If anything,
two decisions handed down subsequently have served to increase the
uncertainty faced by Illinois practitioners.
The first, Klondike Helicopters Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,'2
was decided by a federal court.'8 The action was brought for dam-
ages resulting from the crash of a helicopter manufactured by the
defendant and purchased by plaintiff. Plaintiff's complaint sounded
both in tort and contract. 14
Specifically in issue was whether the causes of action would sur-
vive the Illinois borrowing statute. The effect of such statutes is to
bar actions if they run afoul of either of two statutes of limitation:
(1) the forum's statute, or (2) the statute of another state or terri-
more significant interest in the outcome of the litigation. The case was a particu-
larly apt one for discarding the traditional rule. The injury occurred when defend-
ant's car broke through the iced-over Mississippi River allegedly on the "Iowa
side." This was the only Iowa fact contact. It could not have been more fortuitous
or the application of Iowa law more arbitrary.
11. Clearly, the court's main focus was the quest for a meaningful resolution
of conflicts tort issues. But, in support of its analysis, it quoted heavily from
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) and
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). The quoted
language and the authorities cited therein level an attack not only on the lex loci
delicti in specific, but on the vested rights approach in general.
12. 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
13. It has long been well settled that a federal district court in diversity of
jurisdiction cases must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits,
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), including that state's conflict of law
rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
See generally, R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 66, 150-54 (rev. ed. 1968).
14. Plaintiff had two counts alleging negligence and two asserting a claim based
on products liability. The court characterized these in tort, 334 F. Supp. at 893.
Cf. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
The counts characterized as contract involved an alleged breach of a contractual
provision as well as alleged breaches of both express and implied warranties, 334
F. Supp. at 893.
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tory where the cause of action has arisen.1" The court thus was
faced with two fact determinations-where had the tort causes of
action arisen and where had the contract causes of action arisen.
The court concluded that tort causes of action arise "where the
last act occurred to create liability," viz., where the actual accident
occurred. 16 The court held that on facts such as these, contract
causes of action arise when the contract is executed and where the
article is sold. 17
The court clearly indicates that Ingersoll and the therein adopted
"most significant relationship" test does not control here, for that
case did not speak to the issues of where and when a cause of action
arose, but rather went to the question of what substantive law
should govern it. However, the Klondike decision did not rest here.
The court attempted to establish that even if Ingersoll were to gov-
15. The Illinois borrowing statute provides: "When a cause of action has arisen
in a state or territory out of this state, or in a foreign country, and, by the laws
thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an
action thereon shall not be maintained in this state." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 21
(1969). The Illinois statute is rather typical. See generally, Vernon, Statutes of
Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287
(1960); Comment, Foreign Statute of Limitations: Borrowed Only to Shorten the
Period of Limitations of the Forum, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 452 (1962); Ester, Borrow-
ing Statutes and the Conflict of Laws, 15 FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962).
The rationale for borrowing statutes is said to arise by virtue of the forum
state's statute which invariably calls for tolling the statute while the defendant is
absent from the jurisdiction. In the absence of a borrowing statute this rule would
permit actions against a defendant which otherwise might have been barred by the
laws of any of the states involved in the controversy. Vernon, supra, at 290-93.
16. 334 F. Supp. at 894. In reaching this result the court placed considerable
reliance upon Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill.
1969). That decision, in turn, relied on the landmark Illinois case, Gray v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961), which construed an analogous problem under section 17 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(G) (1971).
17. 334 F. Supp. at 895. The court here relied upon Hardman v. Helene Cur-
tis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964) and Harris v. Ameri-
can Surety Co., 372 Ill. 361, 24 N.E.2d 42 (1939). Neither case dealt with this
problem, and, indeed, it's uncertain that they stand as good authority for this proposi-
tion. One leading commentator has stated that Illinois is the "leading advocate"
of another approach, namely that the cause of action arises in any jurisdiction
where defendant is amenable to process. Ester, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. at 52 and the
cases cited therein at nn. 87-89. This position was also apparently accepted in
Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. at 1175, n.6. Interestingly
enough, even though Klondike relied so heavily on Manos in construing the tort
count statute of limitations problems, see note 16, supra, it did not even mention
the earlier decision when discussing this problem in regard to the contract counts.
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em, the result would be the same. Although statute of limitation is-
sues are usually resolved by characterizing them as procedural mat-
ters governed by forum law, the court, in order to apply a "most
significant relationship" analysis, treated the matter as one of sub-
stantive law. Notwithstanding the tendency in applying borrowing
statutes to disregard the modem conflicts approaches in favor of
more traditional rules,'" the court's dictum is to be welcomed. Bor-
rowing statutes should be treated as substantive, and subjected to a
functional conflicts analysis. 19
The second aspect of this dictum, however, was most unfortunate.
The court discussed the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts approach
only when it analyzed the tort count. There was no discussion of
it whatsoever in the analysis relating to the contract count. This,
obviously, would tend to support a conclusion that Ingersoll is appli-
cable only to tort issues. But the decision does not say this and, in-
deed, it is entirely unclear that this was the court's intent. Nonethe-
less, it served to muddy the waters surrounding the Ingersoll inter-
pretation.19a
18. See also Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D.
Ill. 1969); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Co., 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir.
1966); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 128, 308, n.2 (rev. ed. 1968).
19. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 50 (1971).
The soundness of Professor Weintraub's position is aptly illustrated by the following
example from his text: "For example, P and D, both with settled residences in
state X, drive together into state Y. D is driving with P as passenger when, be-
cause of D's alleged negligence, the automobile leaves the road, strikes a tree, and
P is injured. P receives all his medical treatment in state X. X's statute of limita-
tions is one year; that of Y is five years. P sues D in X four years after the acci-
dent. Treating the statute of limitations issue as substantive and subjecting it to a
full functional choice-of-law analysis, X decides that the policies underlying the X
short statute are fully applicable and that no policy of Y would be significantly
advanced if suit were permitted. X therefore applies its own statute of limitations
and bars suit. This decision by X should be treated as a choice on the merits be-
tween X and Y statutes of limitations and should bar suit even in Y if P subse-
quently brings suit there before the Y five-year statute runs. Assuming that X's
functional analysis is correct, Y should also apply the X statute of limitations and
bar suit even if suit had not first been brought and barred in X. A decision by
the forum to apply its own shorter statute of limitations should not, however, be
binding on other states if the forum purports to act only qua forum. This might be
the case if, in the preceding hypothetical, Y, the place of injury, had the one-year
statute of limitations, X, the residence of both parties, had the five-year statute
and suit were originally brought in Y four years after the accident. Y might ra-
tionally decide that, because of the danger of fraud and mistake from what it con-
sidered a stale claim, Y was not willing to serve as the situs of litigation, although
Y should not be concerned if X subsequently elects to permit the action to pro-
ceed in X."
19a. Compare Mitchell v. Burnett, 1 Ill. App.3d 24, 26 (1971) (traditional rule
governs contract case).
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The second case "muddying the waters" was People v. Saiken.20
Defendant, Samuel Saiken, an Illinois resident, was tried for con-
spiracy to obstruct justice because he helped his son, Joel Saiken,
also an Illinois resident, bury the latter's murder victim. Although
the murder was committed in Illinois, the "burial ceremony" oc-
curred in Indiana. Subsequently, the son, apparently repenting, in-
formed the Indiana police where the corpse was located. The offi-
cer to whom this information was given obtained a search warrant
based on his own affidavit setting forth his conversations with the
younger Saiken.
Defendant contended the evidence was improperly obtained and,
hence, improperly admitted. His contention was based on Indiana
law under which warrants predicated upon hearsay information are
invalid. Illinois law would not have rendered it invalid.
As to admissibility of the evidence, the supreme court simply
stated this to be a procedural matter governed by forum law, i.e.,
Illinois law.2 However, it characterized the preliminary issue of
whether the evidence was wrongfully obtained as a substantive mat-
ter,22 and proceeded to analyze it in "most significant relationship"
20. 49 Ill. 2d 504, 275 N.E.2d 381 (1971).
21. Id. at 510, 275 N.E.2d at 385.
22. Id. The court does not give any authority to support this conclusion, and,
indeed, the one reported case dealing with this problem reached the opposite con-
clusion. Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). There defendant
was prosecuted for burglary with intent to commit rape. The victim managed to
"bite and spit out" a piece of defendant's sweater during the ensuing struggle. This
piece of fabric was recovered by the police and, subsequently, matched against de-
fendant's sweater which was uncovered in his residence in Oklahoma. The search
had been permitted by defendant's wife even though the police officers were without
a search warrant. Defendant contended that the evidence was inadmissible because,
under Oklahoma law, each spouse is given a separate and independent right to
insist that a warrant be obtained before the home is searched. The Texas court
held, however, that this was a procedural issue governed by forum law. But, query,
whether this result would have obtained if it would have resulted in the evidence
being inadmissible?
The Illinois position appears preferable as "substantive" rights appear to be in-
volved here. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, 46-48
(1971); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333 (1933). Interestingly enough, the Saiken decision cites Burge, but with re-
gard to an entirely different aspect of the case. Perhaps then the "oversight"
concerning this particular issue had an element of intent.
The Saiken result would also square up with the Restatement (Second) treatment
of the analogous problem of privileged communications. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONFLICTS § 139(2) (adopted 1969) provides: "Evidence that is privileged
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terms. Finding that the crime was committed in Illinois, it was be-
ing prosecuted there, the defendant was a resident and citizen of
Illinois, the great majority of witnesses who would testify at trial
were Illinois residents, Indiana had no vital contact with the crime,
and that application of Illinois evidentiary law would not offend the
comity of interstate relationships between Indiana and Illinois, the
court applied Illinois law.2"
The result is correct. The problem lies in the language used by
the court. It states that the Restatement (Second) approach gov-
erns because it has replaced the doctrine of lex loci delecti in Ini-
nois."4 Unfortunately, this is not a torts case, and lex loci delecti
has no application. The "substantive" issue involved here is
whether evidence had been wrongfully obtained. If one must pi-
geonhole this into a substantive area, that would probably be the
area of constitutional law.25 Indeed, query whether there is any neat
little substantive law category into which one can tuck this away.
Perhaps one would be best served by merely stating that substantive
rights are involved, i.e., one's right not to be subjected to improper
searches.20
Does Saiken stand for the proposition that Restatement (Second)
governs all areas of substantive law? The decision is not at all
clear on this point. And, as its final "beclouding" act, the court
does not even cite its own decision in Ingersoll; rather it relies upon
the earlier dicta in Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665.
WHERE TO NOW?
A discussion of "where to" presupposes that one knows the pres-
ent state of the law. As indicated above, this presupposes too
much. In only one area of substantive law-torts-does the Illinois
under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the
communication, but which is not privileged under the local law of the forum will
be admitted unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring ad-
mission should not be given effect." And the Saiken result was even more com-
pelling, for Illinois was found to be the most significantly related state. See
note 23 and accompanying text, infra.
23. 49 Ill. 2d at 510, 275 N.E.2d at 385.
24. Id.
25. Cf. Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).
26. Cf. Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919).
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practitioner face certainty. Here, one no longer looks merely to the
place of injury; rather the Restatement (Second) "most significant
relationship" test controls.2 7
The test is two-pronged: both the connecting facts in a given case
as well as certain specified policy-oriented principles are to be con-
sidered. 28  The Restatement (Second) aids in this task by assigning a
qualitative value to specific factual contacts in each substantive area.
In a tort case, the factual contacts generally regarded as most impor-
tant are: (1) the place where the injury occured; (2) the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties;
and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.29
In most cases, however, the end result will not differ from that
obtained under the former vested rights "place of injury" rule. This
is so because the Restatement (Second) makes a still further qualita-
tive fact assessment: it indicates that the law of the place of injury
should govern most tort situations unless the application of the other
specific contact and/or policy principles clearly indicate that an-
other state bears a more significant relationship to the case. 30 In ef-
fect, this re-ushers the vested rights approach in again through the
back door. But not quite. For even though the result will usually
be the same, this need not be the case as the Restatement (Second)
27. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
28. The basic controlling Restatement section is § 145. The factual contacts
are spelled out here in subsection 2 and the policy principles of § 6(2) are in-
corporated by reference. These policy principles are applicable to all substantive
areas of law. They are: (1) the needs of the interstate and international systems;
(2) the relevant policies of the forum; (3) the relevant policies of other inter-
ested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result; and (7) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
These principles seem to reflect a compromise reached during the drafting of the
Restatement (Second) calculated to satisfy at least some desires of the interest analy-
sis proponents. Candidly, however, one wonders whether such generally stated
principles will be of any practical value in the resolution of conflicts cases. The
doubt is heightened by those decisions handed down to date which have utilized the
approach taken in the Restatement (Second). These invariably rely almost in their
entirety on a factual contact analysis in reaching a decision.
29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 145(2) (1969).
30. Id., comment f. This would clearly appear to be the approach taken by
the court in Ingersoll. See 262 N.E.2d at 595. See also Johnson v. Wood, 6 Ill.
App.3d 1015, 286 N.E.2d 637 (1972).
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obviously supplies the court with freedom from compulsion of fixed
rules, and encourages it to apply the law which it believes to have
the strongest claim for application."
It appears imperative that the court resolve as soon as possible
what conflicts approach will govern the other substantive areas of
law. Hopefully, this resolution will be in favor of a modern policy
oriented approach. Clearly, Ingersoll could support this result.32
OTHER MATTERS OF NOTE
Wartell v. Formusa REVISITED
Aurora National Bank v. Anderson33 found an Illinois court once
more focusing on the issue of what law should govern intra-family
tort immunity. The case differed from Wartell only insofar as the
family relationship involved was one of parent and child.
Marilou Laughlin, an unemancipated minor, was a passenger in a
car driven by her mother which was involved in an accident with a
second car. The accident occurred in Iowa. The Laughlins were
Illinois residents. Suit was brought by Marilou against her mother
alleging willful and wanton conduct. Intra-family tort immunity
would bar such an action in Iowa, but not in Illinois. 4 The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the mother. The ap-
pellate court reversed the decision, relying heavily on Wartell, and
concluded that the law of common domicile should control.8 5
31. See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 679, 699 (1963), where the author states: "This rule of most signifi-
cant relationship, at the very least, will not stand in the way of progress. It should
aid in inducing the courts to depart from the place of injury rule in situations
where this is desirable. And it should make clear to the lawyer and litigant that it
can no longer be expected that the place of injury rule will always be applied."
32. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. The author, however, does not
wish to imply that the best approach is necessarily that formulated in the Restate-
ment (Second). It is to be hoped that Illinois courts, in formulating their own
"final" choice of law approaches, will at least consider other alternatives.
33. - Ill. App. 2d -, 268 N.E.2d 552 (1971).
34. Illinois law permits parent-child suits for wanton and wilful conduct.
Mudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956). It is unclear whether
Iowa would permit such suits, but, for purposes of this opinion, the court assumed
that Iowa policy would not allow such an action, 268 N.E.2d at 553.
35. Counsel for defendant attempted to distinguish Wartell on grounds that the
earlier decision involved interspousal immunity whereas a parent-child relationship
was involved in the instant case. His contention was based on the fact that Illinois'
[Vol. XXII !6
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Although the court's reliance on Wartell appears clearly correct,
its analysis of the earlier decision does not. It is cited for the propo-
sition that such controversies are best resolved by characterizing the
problem as one of family law. This appears to be an improper
reading of Wartell.a6 Characterization of the issue there was in
tort.87  Indeed, the very Restatement section8" relied upon both in
Wartell and Aurora National Bank is to be found in the torts chap-
ter and concerns tort immunities. As a practical matter, even if
characterized in tort, the result would be precisely the same, a fact
not overlooked by the court.
But, candidly, the above discussion begs the question. Is it even
necessary to resort to a characterization process or strict adherence to
Restatement (Second) approach? One would hope not. The
courts should simply state that the question of intra-family tort im-
munity is generally to be governed by the law of common domicile. 9
policy regarding interspousal immunity is codified, see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68
(1963), whereas the policy underlying parent-child tort immunity is grounded
only in the common law. Happily, the court rejected this argument, 268 N.E.2d
at 555.
36. Judge Moran quotes a lengthy passage from Wartell which allegedly sup-
ports his position, 268 N.E.2d at 553-54 quoting from 34 Ill. 2d at 59, 213 N.E.2d
at 545. It does not. Apparently, this conclusion was reached by reliance on some
of those decisions cited in the earlier case. Thus, for example, the Aurora Bank
court quotes heavily from Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), a
case cited in Wartell. The case is typical of those predating widespread application
of the modem, policy oriented approaches, i.e., when the rigid, formalistic vested
rights approach held sway. Then, characterization as to substantive area of law was
a popular, oft-times necessary escape device for avoiding harsh, inequitable results.
See W. REESE and M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 494-510 (6th ed. 1971). And
even then Judge Traynor's sweeping language in Emery could probably support
more than a mere "characterization" analysis. See Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity
in the Conflict of Laws: Laws and Reason Versus the Restatement, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 474 (1956); Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959:
Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 263 (1962).
37. The court would have been well advised to note some of the other decisions
cited in Wartell, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), as well as some of the supreme court's later constructions of
it in, e.g., Ingersoll and Graham.
38. The decisions had referred to this section as adopted in Tentative Draft No. 9
of the Restatement (Second) as par. 390g. The present section as finally promul-
gated, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 (1971), differs from the
earlier draft insofar as it specifically provides that the law of domicile will not
control if another state is more significantly related to parties and transactions in
accordance with the general principles governing tort issues as set out in Restate-
ment § 145.
39. The impact, if any, of the change in the finally promulgated Restatement
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As a practical matter, whatever road the analysis may take, it seems
relatively clear that the Illinois practitioner can now safely rely upon
this result.
MULTISTATE TORTS
In Snead v. Forbes,"0 plaintiff, the former president of a large
trucking concern, alleged damage as a result of defamatory com-
ments published in the Forbes business magazine. Since the maga-
zine is distributed nationwide, plaintiff allegedly was injured in every
state
The inherent problems are obvious. Theoretically, each state
might be a proper forum, and each state's law might be applicable.
One would probably produce a literally unintelligible opinion if an
attempt were made to try all the transitory causes of action in one
suit. Moreover, the cost and harassment potential of such litigation
could be staggering. Thus, judicial economy makes it desirable
that one jurisdiction's law be selected to govern the litigation.
This result was accomplished in Snead. The court applied Illinois
law because that was plaintiff's domicile at the time of the alleged
defamation. The court, relying on Ingersoll, concluded this fact
made Illinois the state "most significantly related" to the parties and
transaction.41  The Restatement (Second) assumption, relied upon
in Snead, is that the place of greatest potential injury to plaintiff's
reputation is where plaintiff has lived and worked. This assumption
would generally hold true for multi-state defamations.4 2  If not, i.e.,
plaintiff suffers the greatest harm elsewhere, then that state's law
should govern rather than the law of the domicile.48 This, however,
section, see note 38 supra, remains to be seen. Practically speaking, it appears
unlikely that another state will be found to be more significantly related than that
of the common domicile. This would be particularly true where the state of
common domicile is also the forum.
40. 2 Ill. App. 3d 22, 275 N.E.2d 746 (1971).
41. Id. at 26, 275 N.E.2d at 748-49.
42. Implicit in this assumption, of course, is the fact that the allegedly defama-
tory matter was published in the "domicilliary" jurisdiction. A logical extension of
this rule where plaintiff is not a natural person, but rather a legal entity, e.g., a
corporation, would be to apply the law of the principal place of business or en-
gagement in the activity to which the defamation relates. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAw 336 (rev. ed. 1968).
43. The nexus applied by the Restatement (Second) appears to be the preferable
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is nothing more than a question of fact, clearly fitting within the
analysis and language of Snead.
The result in Snead is analytically consistent with Illinois' treat-
ment of the analogous "multiple publication" defamation problem.
It has adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act."" Under its
terms, the plaintiff is given but "one cause of action" for a tort
"founded upon any single publication." It provides that a judgment
in any jurisdiction in this action "shall bar any other action for
damages by the same plaintiff against the same defendant founded
upon the same publication." Although the Act does not contain
any indication as to what law would govern plaintiff's "one cause of
action," its language would appear to require an analysis as in
Snead.
But one caveat of warning should be added. Potentially, the law
of plaintiff's domicile could be relied upon by defendant to shield it
from liability without in any significant way advancing a substantive
policy of the domicile. This may conflict with interests of other
states that might hold the defendant liable for such publications.
Thus, for example, if the publication has appeared in very few
states, or it is fairly clear on the facts that a cause of action would
not exist under the law of only one or very few states, then it is
entirely possible that no rational purpose would be served by giving
the defendant the benefit of a rule existing in plaintiff's domicile
that would relieve it from liability existing under the laws of other
one. Others are available, however. Thus, the law of defendant's domicile, place of
incorporation or main publishing office could govern. This approach would
obviously make it easy to obtain service on the defendant. It would also often re-
sult in the forum court being able to apply its own law. Its principal disadvantage
lies in the fact that this state might otherwise bear no relationship to either the
defamation or resulting harm. See note, Single Publication Doctrine and Con-
flicts of Law Problems in Multi-State Libel, 43 ILL. L. REv. 556, 560 (1948);
Note, Multi-State Libel and Conflict of Laws, 35 VA. L REV. 627, 633 (1949).
One could apply the law of that state where defendant's acts commencing the al-
leged defamation occurred. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional
Multi-State Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1,
34 (1951), where the author proposes that the law of the place of acting govern all
intentional torts including defamation. See also Comment, The Choice of Law in
Multistate Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: An Unsolved Problem, 60 HARv.
L. REv. 941, 946 (1947). Lastly, the forum could simply apply its own law. See
Willenbucher v. McCormick, 229 F. Supp. 659 (D. Colo. 1964). Compare Dale
System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126, §§ 11-15 (1971).
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states having an interest in compensating the plaintiff and in dis-
couraging tortious conduct of this kind within their own jurisdic-
tions.4" In short, the search for judicial economy should not be re-
garded as a definitive, inflexible end-all for such problems.
One should also note that the Snead principles would be applica-
ble to other multi-state torts situations, most importantly those in-
volving invasion of the right of privacy. 6
45. An argument to this effect was presented by the plaintiff in Snead, viz.,
defendant had the benefit of Illinois' innocent construction rule although the state
of its principal place of business and most other states would not have accorded it
this protection. The court did not find this persuasive. 275 N.E.2d at 749.
46. Compare Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corporation, 229 F.2d
481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Strickler v. National
Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958). See generally, Ludwig, "Peace
of Mind" in 48 Pieces v. Unijorm Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REv. 734 (1948).
